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TomBen’s Web Excursions

电报频道的标志 tombenor — TomBen’s Web Excursions T
电报频道的标志 tombenor — TomBen’s Web Excursions
通道地址: @tombenor
类别: 没有类别
语言: 中国
用户: 2.16K
频道的描述

Artificial algorithms on the open web. 杂七杂八,英中夹杂。
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最新信息 6

2022-07-16 17:09:41 Speaking in Stickers

For many in urban China, WeChat has collapsed the personal, professional, and parasocial into one interface, and more crucially, one single online profile. Work, social life, shopping, payments, news — very little of daily life requires one to leave the WeChat interface. It isn’t much of a real option to leave either.

As a necessary survival skill, WeChat users must develop a fluid understanding of the app’s meta-structures: the circles of visibility for posts, an awareness of the potential for incriminating screenshots, techniques for reading behavioral gestures via quirks of its interface. When everything is said on the record,  there is a lot at stake in how you speak. The Chinese web is, above all, a linguistic battleground haunted by deletions, ringed with no-go zones, and pockmarked with banned phrases. WeChat frequently erupts in whack-a-mole skirmishes between users trying to push through a sensitive message, and censors (now both human and AI) zapping recognizable instances out of people’s timelines and chat logs.

Being online means arming yourself with a sophisticated arsenal of forms of indirect speech: The widespread spiky, passive-aggressive performativity seen on the platform, for instance, can actually be understood as a kind of coping mechanism. It’s a careful staging of life and work, a necessarily low-key basking in noncommittal expressions of disavowed emotional states like frustration or laziness.

They have also become crucial to communication where the implied is preferred over the stated. They provide an everyday shared cipher, a way of hinting at something without stating it outright.

Stickers have no direct equivalent elsewhere, having evolved to meet the Chinese web’s very specific needs for visual expression. Their kaleidoscopic intertextuality is the result of over two decades of shape-shifting through conventions, norms, and censorship.

Stickers could be understood as a more quotidian version of what Asian Studies professor Margaret Hillenbrand, in her book Negative Exposures, theorizes as a “photo form”: media that involves a “labor of decipherment [that] binds people together,” creating intimate, interpersonal “coded archives” of clarity, in-jokes, and shared meaning. She draws on lingering (and clandestinely circulated) images of traumatic and powerful events in China from the long 20th century — the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Cultural Revolution — to show how photo forms function within suppressive environments as modes for visualizing what is hard to say aloud.

Stickers reveal how the realities of public secrecy in China within the culture of the everyday have crystallized. With stickers, the tactics of visual ambiguity, remixing, humor, affective masking, irony, and ambivalence — once the preserve of artists dealing with significant political events — have become a primary part of mundane visual expression.

While the Chinese web is often understood as purely preventing expression through censorship, this discursive space that stickers have carved out under WeChat’s shadow recalls Michel Foucault’s conception of power as productive: Repression doesn’t just stop expression but causes it to morph into new forms. At the same time, these new forms provide new, ambivalent means of solace.

Stickers help solidify their own performative disidentification against a “positive energy” mainstream, offering subtle templates of affective response that allow people to access (and normalize) “unspeakable” emotions too unseemly for a public persona, such as depression, anger, confusion, or lust. Within WeChat’s restrictive templates for online life, stickers’ ubiquity opens a space for a shared affective repertoire that runs counter to the uses that the app and the state want to prescribe. What can occur in that space is not necessarily or automatically a form of impactful resistance, but it does open a space of ambivalence and possibility.
117 views14:09
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2022-07-16 14:43:18
说话节奏慢,停顿多,云里雾里绕,不接话回应,不正面回应,这些也都是展现权力的方式。 source
96 views11:43
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2022-07-15 11:56:07
59 views08:56
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2022-07-15 11:23:19 China’s Xi Pushing to Beat the U.S. In GDP Growth Despite Covid Lockdowns https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-xi-pushing-to-beat-the-u-s-in-gdp-growth-despite-covid-lockdowns-11650976212
17 views08:23
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2022-07-15 04:29:08 Xi Jinping has nurtured an ugly form of Chinese nationalism

https://www.economist.com/china/2022/07/13/xi-jinping-has-nurtured-an-ugly-form-of-chinese-nationalism
142 views01:29
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2022-07-15 04:10:15 Do not ask your children to strive by William Martin
144 views01:10
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2022-07-13 09:04:59 一位 农民 的一生
289 views06:04
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2022-07-12 16:42:06 The voice from people in Shanghai, and all over the country.

https://twitter.com/MarkFlegm/status/1546819711853215744
64 viewsedited  13:42
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2022-07-12 10:26:32 WeChat Is China’s Most Beloved (and Feared) Surveillance Tool

Despite its name, which makes it sound like a messaging service, this one app dominates almost every facet of a person’s daily online existence in China—banking, dating, gaming, music, shopping, social media. It’s one of the largest social media platforms, with more people actively using it than Twitter and Snapchat put together.

WeChat appears to be a source of alternating comfort and concern for Xi. Its ubiquity makes it a powerful tool of surveillance and control. It has also been misused by a member of his own political party to spy on colleagues, people familiar with the incident say, and has offered a venue for citizens to express collective outrage, as they did this spring when the country’s Covid-19 response faltered. Ma faced a choice: remodel his business, and himself, in the image of Xi’s new China or risk losing everything.

WeChat also offers an important utility to the Chinese government. The app is heavily censored and closely monitored at the direction of officials in Beijing. But the vicissitudes of Chinese political life mean Tencent can find itself in jeopardy even when following orders.

Tencent got into trouble again when Beijing learned of a project inside the company designed to predict political succession, people familiar with the effort say. It sought to use data science to estimate who’d join the Politburo’s standing committee, they say. The prediction system, commissioned by the same former employee accused of spying for Sun, was never completed, a person with knowledge of the project says. Ma had no involvement, the person says. Tencent declined to comment.

Unknown to most people, though, is that the surveillance and Politburo modeling scandals had set off alarms at the highest echelons of the Communist Party, people with knowledge of the fallout say. Those efforts underscored the power Ma possessed, and Beijing made a determination: Tencent had to be reined in.

To regain control of the narrative, the government ordered internet platforms to wipe posts deemed negative or critical of the policies, sending WeChat censors into overdrive. This further antagonized the people of Shanghai. Their frustrations culminated in an unprecedented wave of public outcry in April.

The era of the tech idol is over.

“Tencent is not an infrastructure-service company and can be replaced at any given moment,” he told employees, according to the local news outlet Late Post. The company’s mission should be to service the country and society and make sure it “doesn’t overstep,” he said. “Be a good assistant.”
166 views07:26
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2022-07-11 17:37:31 Some iPhone headlines from 2007
114 views14:37
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